In this paper we consider the normal modal logics of elementary classes defined by first-order formulas of the form ∀x 0 ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n x i R λ x j . We prove that many properties of these logics, such as finite axiomatisability, elementarity, axiomatisability by a set of canonical formulas or by a single generalised Sahlqvist formula, together with modal definability of the initial formula, either simultaneously hold or simultaneously do not hold.
Introduction
This research was motivated by the following observation. Consider two first-order conditions: ∀x∃y(xRy ∧ yRx) and ∀x∃y(xRy ∧ yRy) (see Figure 1 ). The first one is modally definable by a Sahlqvist formula p → 33p while the second is not, since it does not reflect ultrafilter extensions (e.g., [2] , p. 142). The difference between these two formulas becomes even more palpable if we look at the modal logics L 1 and L 2 of the corresponding elementary classes. While L 1 is axiomatisable (with the standard rules of Substitution, Modus Ponens and Necessitation) by a single Sahlqvist formula, L 2 is not finitely axiomatisable and the class of Kripke frames {F | F |= L 2 } is not definable by any formula of first-order logic [14] . Moreover, any axiomatisation of L 2 requires infinitely many non-canonical formulas [13] . On the other hand, both formulas have a common structure and can be represented by graphs as in Figure 1 , which are called diagrams in this paper. We decided that this issue is worthy of additional explanation. So we undertook a study with the purpose of classifying all elementary classes C definable by formulas of the form ∀x 0 E(x 0 ) where E(x 0 ) = ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n x i R λ x j according to the following model-theoretic properties (whose precise definitions will be given in Section 2). (I-vi) Log(C) is axiomatisable by a set of modal formulas containing finitely many propositional variables;
(I-vii) Log(C) is axiomatisable by a set of canonical formulas;
(I-viii) Log(C) is axiomatisable by a modal formula φ and a set of canonical formulas;
(I-ix) {F | F |= Log(C)} = C;
(I-x) {F | F |= Log(C)} is elementary.
Briefly, we prove that for any class C in question, conditions (I-i) -(I-x) either simultaneously hold, or simultaneously do not hold, and this is determined by the existence in the corresponding diagram of an undirected cycle not passing through the universally quantified points, provided that the diagram is "minimal", i.e., none of its edges may be removed without affecting the corresponding formula, and "rooted", i.e., each of its points is reachable from x 0 via a directed path.
We exclude from our list such algorithmical properties as decidability, finite model property and complexity, and do not deal with them in this paper, since an easy argument shows that all logics in our class have f.m.p. and are PSPACE-complete regardless of the mentioned cycle. But we mention that dichotomies similar to ours but in the complexity-theoretic setting have recently become known to the logical community. For example, in [11] the modal logics of universal Horn sentences are classified into those that are in NP and those that are PSPACEhard and this classification was further refined in [22] . The authors of [21] classified universal relational constraints with respect to the complexity of reasoning in EL.
We claim that this work is in line with current research in theoretical modal logic. First, this result can be considered as a straighforward generalisation of Hughes' paper [14] . The axiomatics of [14] was generalised in [1] to the case of first-order conditions of the form ∀x∃y(xR λ y∧φ(y)) where φ(y) is a generalised Kracht formula [16] , and for some particular logics of this form finite axiomatisability, the finite model property and elementarity are studied there. The authors of [1] also conjectured that within their class there is also a coincidence between finite axiomatisability and elementarity 1 , and between ∆-elementarity and elementarity (cf. [25] ).
Another central problem of modal logic is: given an elementary class, i.e., a first-order formula, provide an explicit axiomatisation of the corresponding modal logic (this was done in [12] ), and describe its properties, for example, in terms of (I-i)-(I-x) (cf. problems 6.6 and 6.8 ibid.) Since the product of two elementary classes is elementary [7] , the school of many dimensional modal logic deals mainly with such problems (e.g., [19] , [20] and [6] for older results). In general, the algorithmic problem 'given a first-order formula, decide whether each of (I-i )-(I-x) holds' should be undecidable due to the undecidability of first-order logic. E.g., for (I-iii) it is Chagrova's theorem [5] , [4] , but it seems plausible that using the method of [4] one can prove such undecidability results for all items. On the other hand, when we restrict attention to a fragment of the first-order language with decidable implication, then we have chances to obtain such algorithmic criteria (as, e.g. in [17] ), and our paper is a step in this direction.
One more fundamental problem of modal logic is to study which implications between (I-i)-(I-x) hold, and which of these conditions are independent. A brief summary of known results is given in [12] (see discussion after Problem 6.6), and we think that our result is interesting in this context.
Our paper also concerns a phenomenon called "canonicity in the limit", referring to the logics (or, more generally, in terms of universal algebra, sets of equations that are true on some elementary class), that are canonical, but cannot be axiomatized by canonical formulas, and, even more, any axiomatisation of such logics requires infinitely many non-canonical axioms. Beside the aforementioned Hughes' logic, this issue includes the equational theories of representable relational [13] and cylindrical [3] algebras, and the well-known McKinsey-Lemmon logic [9] . It turns out that all logics under consideration in our paper excepting those which are generally Sahlqvist have this property; thus, what was thought pathological can now be seen to be the norm.
And -last but not least -our paper can be regarded as a contribution to the question of whether there are natural generalisations of Sahlqvist's theorem in the basic modal language, besides [10] , [23] , [24] . From our result it follows that the Sahlqvist theorem cannot be generalised further within the formulas of our class.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we take a diagram, all the cycles of which pass through the root, and use the result from [18] stating that the corresponding first-order formula E(x 0 ) is modally definable by a generalised Sahlqvist formula, and so, by the generalised Sahlqvist's theorem [10] , (I-i) -(I-x) hold. Then we have to take a diagram with a cycle not passing through the root, and show that (I-i) -(I-x) do not hold. This can be done only if E(x 0 ) is "minimal", i.e., it does not contain atoms which can be thrown away without changing E(x 0 ). Indeed, the diagram in Figure 1 on the right has a cycle not passing through the root, but it is modally definable, since it is equivalent to the reflexivity condition. So we additionally
assume that the diagram is minimal. This can be done without any loss of generality, since we may take any formula of our class and remove superfluous edges until the formula becomes minimal. Under this assumption we prove that (I-i) -(I-x) do not hold in Sections 7 -11. For this purpose we need the axiomatisations of the corresponding modal logics, constructed in Section 4. Then we construct 'non-standard frames' for our logic ensuring falsity of (I-i) -(I-x).
To understand the intuition underlying these non-standard frames and the problems arising in their construction, recall [18] , where similar frames are used to prove that (I-ii) does not hold for any diagram with a cycle of the given form. Roughly, we temporarily remove one of the edges of a diagram D belonging to a cycle (dashed edge in D in Figure 2 ), then clone the rest of the diagram (more precisely, all points except the root) ω times, preserving edges of the diagram inside each layer and between the root and any layer, and insert the deleted arrow between corresponding points of different layers, from layers with lesser numbers to layers with greater numbers. Denote this Kripke frame by F (Figure 2 , in the middle). One can show that F has a root r and satisfies F |= E(r) and (F )
u.e. |= E(r), yielding the negation of (I-ii).
Now imagine that we want to generalise this construction to prove that (I-iii) does not hold. In this case we need our construction to validate a stronger condition (F ) u.e. |= ∀xE(x), so the construction must be modified accordingly. In many cases we can just 'put on top' of F a reflexive point (Figure 2 , on the right), but in general this approach does not work and a more subtle construction is required. So in Lemma 7 we 'saturate' D by adding new points until it satisfies ∀x(x = x 0 → E D (x)), and thus construct a Kripke frame F 
Preliminaries
Fix a set of propositional variables P V = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . }, a set of nominals N V = {j 1 , j 2 , . . . }, and a set of indices Λ. Propositional variables are also denoted by p, q, r, . . . and nominals by i, j, k, . . . . Hybrid formulas are built from propositional variables and nominals using the constant ⊥, the binary connective →, and unary connectives 3 λ for λ ∈ Λ and ∃i for i ∈ N V . Other constructs are defined as usual: in particular, 2 λ is a shorthand for ¬3 λ ¬ and ∀i is a shorthand for ¬∃i¬. A Kripke frame is a tuple Given a Kripke frame F and valuations θ and τ , we define the truth of hybrid formulas in a point x ∈ W F as usual:
F, θ, τ, x |= ∃iφ ⇐⇒ for some nominal valuation τ such that t (j) = t(j) for all j ∈ N V \ {i} we have F, θ, τ, x |= φ.
A modal formula is a hybrid formula without nominals and nominal quantifiers. The truth of a modal formula φ at a point x ∈ W F of a Kripke frame F depends only on the propositional valuation θ and is denoted by F, θ, x |= φ. A modal formula φ is said to be valid in a point x ∈ W F of a Kripke frame F (denoted by F, x |= φ) if for all valuations θ we have F, θ, x |= φ, and it is said to be valid in a Kripke frame F (denoted F |= φ) if for all x ∈ W F we have
We can regard Kripke frames as models for the classical first-order language Lf Λ , the signature of which consists of binary predicate symbols R λ for all λ ∈ Λ; the formulas of this language are called in the sequel simply first-order formulas. Thus the truth relation F |= A is also defined for closed first-order formulas A, also called first-order sentences. A first-order sentence A is said to be globally modally definable if there exists a modal formula φ such that for any Kripke frame F , F |= φ iff F |= A. A first-order formula A(x) with a single free variable x is said to be locally modally definable if for any Kripke frame F and any point w in F , F, w |= φ iff F |= A(w) for some modal formula φ.
Each first-order formula A defines the class of Kripke frames Mod(A) = {F | F |= A}. A class of Kripke frames C is said to be elementary if it is of this form, and ∆-
Mod(A i ) for some sequence of first-order formulas {A i }. Given a class of Kripke frames C, by Log(C) we denote the set of all modal formulas valid in all frames of C. A normal modal logic is a set of modal formulas containing all propositional tautologies, the formulas
and closed under inference rules Modus Ponens, Uniform Substitution and Necessitation:
It is easy to see that Log(C) is always a normal modal logic. A set of modal formulas Σ axiomatises a normal modal logic L if L is the minimal (w.r.t. set-theoretic inclusion) normal modal logic containing Σ. A modal logic is said to be finitely axiomatisable if it is axiomatised by some finite Σ, and axiomatisable using finitely many variables if it is axiomatised by some Σ such that only a finite number of propositional variables occur in Σ. A modal formula φ is said to be canonical if it is valid in the canonical frame of the normal modal logic axiomatised by φ.
Minimal Diagrams and Kripke frames
In this paper we deal with tuples of the form 
P C here means the classical predicate calculus. Global minimality implies local minimality, but the converse fails in general. For instance, the diagram D corresponding to the formula
is locally but not globally minimal.
The following definitions are given for an arbitrary relational structure
is called a directed path of length h connecting z 1 to z h+1 in F . To obtain the definition of an undirected path, we put 
Axiomatisation
can be obtained using the algorithm from [12] . This algorithm allows one to write modal axioms for any normal modal logic generated by a first-order formula φ preserved under pmorphic images, disjoint unions and generated submodels, and this is our case. The algorithm consists of two stages: in the first stage we construct a 'hybrid equivalent' of φ, and in the second stage we translate these hybrid formulas into modal axioms. We also note that our axioms and completeness proof are similar to those in [26] for the "reflexive successor" logic.
To translate E D (x 0 ) into hybrid language, we need to construct a spanning tree 2 for D.
is called a tree with a root r if the following holds
) for all x = r there is a unique directed path from r to x.
PROPOSITION 2 (e.g., Lemma 5.5 from [18] ). For any rooted diagram D there exists a spanning tree T for D. Now, to every x i we assign a nominal j i and the hybrid formula
Then, arguing by induction on T , moving from leaves to the root, to any point
. . , φ n ) we denote the result of substitution of modal formulas φ l for nominals
For a set of formulas Ψ and a map κ :
where the disjunction is taken over all possible maps κ :
Proof. Soundness. Given a Kripke frame
. . , y n ). For uniformity denote α by y 0 .
Let θ be a valuation on F . For a fixed i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, let ε(i) be the boolean vector, the j-th component of which tells whether y i belongs to θ(p j ), and let κ(i) =p ε(i) . It is easy to check
Completeness. Let F = (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ)) be the canonical frame for K+{γ
W is the set of all maximal (K + {γ
-consistent sets (mcs) of formulas, and T R λ S iff for all formulas φ ∈ S 3 λ φ ∈ T for any mcs's S, T ∈ W . We show that F |= ∀x 0 E D (x 0 ), and it follows that the logic K + {γ
| h ∈ ω} is Kripke complete with respect to the elementary class defined by ∀x 0 E D (x 0 ).
n ). By V we denote the set of word tuples w = (w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w n ), where w i ∈ {0, 1} * . We set
is a transitive tree with branching 2 n+1 in each node. Suppose that ψ 1 , ψ 2 , ψ 3 , . . . is an enumeration of all modal formulas. For a word w ∈ {0, 1} * , by w j we denote the j-th symbol of w and we set
where for a modal formula ψ, ψ 1 = ψ, ψ 0 = ¬ψ. By w # we denote η D (w 
, such that any tuple formed by the initial segments of its components is good. By setting contains j h ∧ 3j l as a subformula, maybe preceded by diamonds and conjunctions, and thus w # is built from {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m } using ∧, 3 λ and has a subformula 2 λ ¬ψ i ∧ 3 λ ψ i .
Let d be the depth of the spanning tree T for D used in the construction of η D . We will also use formulas γ
Intuitively, γ D m says that 'if an d-neighborhood of a point x of F is coloured in m colours, then we can paintT in m colors such that the points ofT with equal labels have equal colours and there exists a homomorphism fromT to F preserving the colouring, whereT is a reduced syntactical tree of η D defined as follows.
DEFINITION 5. Let φ be a formula built from nominals j k using only ∧ and 3 λ . A labelled tree with a root r is a tupleT = (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ), r, f ), where (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ), r) is a tree with a root r and f (a label function) is a map from W to P({x 0 , . . . , x n }).
A reduced syntactical tree of a formula φ is a labelled treeT
defined by induction on the length of φ. Case 1: φ = j k , where k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Then T φ contains a single point y. The map f φ takes y to {x k } and the relations R φ λ are empty. 
where r φ is a new point. The R µ for µ = λ we leave untouched, and to R λ we add an arrow, joining r φ with r ψ . We put f (r φ ) = ∅, and do not change f in all other points.
From the definition ofT and η D it follows that the label function ofT maps points ofT to singletons, and so it can be understood as a homomorphism fromT to D. The labelled treeT may be also understood as a sort of unravelling of the initial diagram D.
EXAMPLE 6. Let D be as in the Figure 3 on the left. The spanning tree T is in the middle of the Figure 3 , and so η = j 0 ∧ 3(j 2 ∧ 3j 1 ) ∧ 3(j 1 ∧ 3j 2 ), the reduced syntactical tree of which is in the Figure 3 on the right. Thus the logic L D is axiomatized by the formulas
A property of globally minimal diagrams
Suppose that D and D are diagrams. A map f : Figure 3 : A diagram D and its 1-unravellingT .
LEMMA 7. For any globally minimal rooted diagram D with an inner cycle, there exist two pointed finite Kripke frames 
and for all 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n and λ ∈ Λ
(C-iv) and (C-v) are technical conditions needed to prove that, for example, the pseudoproducts constructed in to h(D). Therefore there must be points
. Now we have a contradiction to the facts that h is a homomorphism to In general, to satisfy conditions (C-i) -(C-v), we can always build a spanning tree for D, and take F + = D and
is one of the edges of the inner cycle not belonging to the spanning tree. The main problem is condition (C-vi). In this example we got it at the price of a reflexive point on top of D. But in some cases this may break the conditions (C-v) and (C-ii), as the next example shows, so a more subtle construction is required.
EXAMPLE 9.
Consider the diagram D on the left hand side of Figure 5 . It is minimal. But if we choose the edge to delete (it could be done in a unique way without affecting connectivity;
this edge is dashed in the figure in the middle), add a reflexive point and connect all points except the root to this reflexive point, then the obtained diagram (even after removing the selected arrow) will satisfy E D (x 0 ) (see the frame in the middle), and that is bad. But we can amend this situation by a more elaborate construction as on the right hand side. Roughly, at first we iteratedly add new points by considering E D (x 0 ) as a tuple-generating rule, and only after that we close the construction with a reflexive point.
The proof of Lemma 7. For a pointed frame
), where
, add a new all-λ-reflexive point •, and join all points y of F (r, D) not satisfying E D (y) to it by all R λ . Then we set g(
is an arbitrary chosen edge of the inner cycle that does not belong to some spanning tree for D. 
First, consider the case when h(x α ) ∈ ∆. Then there is nothing to prove, because in this case i k = 0 for 2 ≤ k ≤ n, and i 1 = α since g(x α ) / ∈ Γ. So, suppose that h(x α ) / ∈ ∆. This means that
Let us prove that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n we have rank (x i k ) < rank (x α ). To this end, note that the distance in
Now, suppose that for some k we have rank (x i k ) ≥ rank (x α ). Then, taking into account (3) we obtain that
a contradiction. Hence, rank (x i k ) < rank (x α ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and, in particular,
, then a similar argument works. Now, suppose that rank (x β ) > rank (x α ). Let B ⊆ W D be the set of all points of rank greater than rank (x α ).
But as x α is supposed to be an element of ∆ \ Γ of maximal rank, from the definition of B it follows that h(B) = g(B), and, in particular, for all k > 2 x i k = x 0 = x α . Now, let the diagram D be obtained from D by deleting x α together with all adjacent edges. Then
, and this contradicts the global minimality of D.
We have just proved (1) of (C-v). The map h acts on the set
. From (1) it follows that h is injective on Arr(D). Therefore, since Arr(D) is finite, h is surjective on Arr(D), and so satisfies (2) of (C-v).
Condition (C-ii) is a consequence of (C-v) and (C-i).
Ultrafilters, ultrafilter extension and ultraproducts
In this section we recall those definitions that involve ultrafilters and ultrafilter extentions, and are used in the proofs below.
(u2) if X ∈ u and X ⊂ Y , then Y ∈ u;
(u3) X / ∈ u iffX ∈ u, whereX denote the complement W \ X.
From the definition it follows that for any ultrafilter u over a set W ∅ / ∈ u and W ∈ u.
Given a frame F = (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ)), its ultrafilter extension is the frame F u.e. = (W u.e. , (R u.e. λ : λ ∈ Λ)), where W u.e. is the set of all ultrafilters over W , and uR u.e. λ u holds for ultrafilters u and u iff R −1 λ (X) ∈ u for all X ∈ u , where R −1 λ (X) = {z | zR λ x for some x ∈ X}. Given a point a ∈ W , the set π a = {X ⊆ W | a ∈ X} is obviously an ultrafilter; it is called the principal ultrafilter generated by a. LEMMA 12. Let u be an ultrafilter over
Proof. Induction on n. The cases n = 1, n = 2 follow immediately from the definition of an ultrafilter. Now suppose that the lemma is proven for some fixed n and let us prove that it is true for n + 1. Let
. By inductive assumption we get either W i ∈ u for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, or W n ∪ W n+1 ∈ u. In the last case, if W n / ∈ u and
This contradicts (u3) and W n ∪ W n+1 ∈ u. Thus there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1 such that W i ∈ u. If there are two such i's, then ∅ ∈ u.
We need yet another model-theoretic construction involving ultrafilters. Suppose that we have a family of Kripke frames
) for all i ∈ ω and a non-principal ultrafilter u over ω. We say that two sequencesᾱ = (α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , . . .) and β = (β 0 , β 1 , β 2 , . . .), where α i , β i ∈ W i for all i ∈ ω are u-equivalent (denoted byᾱ ∼ uβ ), if {i | α i = β i } ∈ u. By W we denote the set of all such sequences. The equivalence class of a sequence α we denote by α .
The
), where W = { all sequences of points from W }/ ∼ u , and
is called an ultrapower of F and is denoted by 
Pseudoproducts with graphs
By a graph we understand a tuple G = (V, E), where E is a symmetric binary relation on V .
To emphasis symmetricity of E, instead of (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ E we sometimes write {v 1 , v 2 } ∈ E. For a ordinal α ≤ ω an α-colouring of a graph G is a map τ : V → α, such that every two adjacent vertices are mapped to different elements of α. The elements of α in this context are called colours. In general, below we do not suppose E to be irreflexive, thus G may contain edges of the form (v, v), which are called loops. However, it is clear that any graph that contains loops Figure 6 : A pseudoproduct.
does not have colourings at all, and so in Lemma 14, (C2) we implicitly assume that G does not have loops.
We fix a rooted minimal diagram D with an inner cycle. Let
An example of this construction for D and F D ± from Example 8 is given in Figure 6 . This construction has a simpler description in terms of projection functions. If pr denotes the projection from F 
Recall that L is axiomatized by formulas γ D n of Section 4 saying "if an d-neighborhood of a point x of F is painted in m colours, then we can paintT in m colors such that the points ofT with equal labels have equal colours and there exists a homomorphism fromT to F preserving the colouring". In this section we omit˜over T and thusT
and we understand f T as a homomorphism from T to D. By β below we denote the composition
The next lemma shows the connection between the chromatic number of G and the least k for which γ 
Since G cannot be painted in 2 bk colours, there exist 
Recall that there is a natural projection pr :
Besides pr, there is a projection f T : T → D. We say that a map b :
To prove that
it is sufficient to prove that there is no homomorphism
For the sake of contradiction, assume that such a exists. Consider the following map h :
(see Figure 7) . It is clear that h is well defined, i.e., it does not depend on the choice of t, since if
, and this means that pr(a(t 1 )) = pr(a(t 2 )) due to the definition of θ. Clearly, h is a homomorphism from D to F D + , and it makes the diagram in Figure 7 commutative. Now we apply (C-v) of Lemma 7 and conclude that the image of h is {g(x 0 ), g(x 1 ), . . . , g(x n )}.
Then we apply (C-iv). Let y 1 R λ 1 y 2 . . . R λ n−1 y s , where y i ∈ W D ± for 1 ≤ i ≤ s and λ i ∈ Λ ± for 1 ≤ i < s, be the path connecting
for some w 1 , w 2 ∈ W D , then there exist points w 1 , w 2 ∈ W T such that T |= w 1 R λ w 2 and
We apply this statement s − 1 times for z i , R λ i and z i+1 , and conclude that there exist points
Note that by the definition of t i and t i we have pr(a(t i )) = pr(a(t i )) = y i . Thus, let v i ∈ V and v j ∈ V for 1 ≤ i < s and 1 < j ≤ s be such that a(t i ) = (y i , v i ) and a(t j ) = (y i , v j ). Let us show that
(a): Since T |= t i R λ i t i+1 , due to the definition of R D,G and the facts that (f
Together, (a) and (b) give us that τ (v 1 ) = τ (v s ). On the other hand, since
together with the facts that a is a homomorphism and that τ is a colouring of G imply that τ (v 1 ) = τ (v s ) (recall that y 1 = x d and y s = x d ), a contradiction.
Pseudoproducts with complete graphs
Fix a diagram D. For an ordinal α let K α denote the complete graph with α vertices.
Proof. For finite α this is a consequence of Lemma 14, (C2) and the fact that
for all i ∈ ω and every Kripke frame F (Theorem 3, Soundness). Then notice
We put W 0 = {w 0 }, and First, we prove that (F
. To this end we fix an arbitrary non-principal ultrafilter u over α, put X i = {g(x i )} × α (thus every X i = W j for some j) and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n define ultrafilters µ i by the following condition
Also, put µ 0 = π w 0 . It is easy to check that
u.e. λ µ j , and so (F
. . , µ n ) (for details, see Section 5 of [18] ). Now let us show that for arbitrary ultrafilter v, such that
Hence, by Lemma 12 for some s W s ∈ v. Let u be the ultrafilter on α defined by condition
But, according to (C-vi), there exist points w k 1 , . . . , w kn such that
. . , w kn ). Now, define ultrafilters µ i for i = 1, . . . , n by the condition
We claim that (F
and so (F
LEMMA 17. Let u be an ultrafilter over ω. Then
Inverse limit of descriptive frames
This section is written along the lines of [9] .
A general frame is a triple (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) where (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ)) is a Kripke frame and P ⊆ 2 W is non-empty and closed under intersection, complement and R −1 λ . A general frame (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) is said to be a descriptive frame if 1. If x, y ∈ W are distinct, then there is some S ∈ P with x ∈ S and y / ∈ S.
2. If x, y ∈ W and ¬R λ (x, y), then there is some S ∈ P with x ∈ R −1 λ (S) and y / ∈ S.
3. µ = 0 for every µ ⊆ P with finite intersection property.
Below we denote general frames by calligraphic letters to distinguish between them and Kripke frames. If F = (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ)) is a Kripke frame, we write
if F is finite (i.e., W is finite), then F + is a descriptive frame. If F = (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) is a descriptive frame, we write F + for its underlying Kripke frame F = (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ)). Let F = (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) be a general frame and φ a modal formula. We say that φ is valid in F, written F |= φ if (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ), θ, w |= φ for every assigment θ : P V → P and every w ∈ W .
An inverse family of descriptive frames is an object I = ((I, ≤), F i , (f ij : i ≥ j in I)) where (I, ≤) is an upwards-directed partial order ('upwards-directed' means that any finite subset of I has an upper bound in I), F i = (W i , ((R i ) λ : λ ∈ Λ), P i ) is a descriptive frame for each i ∈ I, and for each i, j ∈ I with i ≥ j f ij : F i → F j is a frame homomorphism such that (a) f ii is the identity map on W i , and (b) f jk • f ij = f ik whenever k ≤ j ≤ i in I.
The inverse limit lim ← I of I is defined to be F = (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) where
P is generated by {f
where in the last line for each i ∈ I f i : W → W i is the projection given by f i (x) = x i .
11.4). The inverse limit F of I is itself a descriptive frame. Moreover, for any modal formula φ, if φ is valid in F i for each i, then φ is valid in F.
Ignoring the line defining P , we obtain the definition of an inverse limit lim ← I of families of Kripke frames and graphs. If I = (ω, ≤) and f ij are clear from context, we denote the system simply {F i }, and the inverse limit by lim ← F i .
Then we want to use first-order compactness. To do this, we regard a general frame (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) as a first-order structure whose domain is the disjoint union of W and P , with unary relations defining W and P and binary relations R λ ⊆ W × W and ⊆ W × P interpreted in the natural way. It is easy to write down a finite set ∆ of first-order sentences expressing that a structure for this signature is a general frame.
As is well known, every modal formula φ has a standard translation to a formula ST x (φ) of first-order logic with a free variable x. We modify this here by regarding propositional variables as first-order variables. For a propositional variable p, we define ST x (p) to be x p. We put ST x ( ) = , ST x (φ ∧ ψ) and similarly for negation, ST x (2 λ φ) = ∀y(R λ (x, y) → ST y (φ)) and where y is a new variable. For a formula φ(p 1 , . . . , p n ), we write ST (φ) for the universal closure ∀x ∈ W ∀p 1 . . . p n ∈ P ST x (φ). For a set X of modal formulas we write ST (X) for {ST (φ) : φ ∈ X}. Clearly, a modal formula φ is valid in a general frame G iff ST (φ) is true in it in first-order semantics:
Hence, φ is valid in a Kripke frame F iff ST (φ) is true in F + in first-order semantics:
LEMMA 19 (Lemma 4.2 from [9] ). Let F = (W, (R λ : λ ∈ Λ)) be a descriptive frame with countable P , and φ be a canonical formula. Then F |= φ implies F + |= φ.
With these preliminaries in hand we can prove the following lemma.
LEMMA 20. Let γ i be a sequence of modal formulas such that
Suppose that for all l there exists n such that for all k there exists an inverse system of finite Kripke frames {F i } such that:
Then any axiomatisation of L = K + {γ n : n ∈ ω} has infinitely many non-canonical axioms.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that L is axiomatised by a single axiom B together with a set Σ of canonical formulas. Since Σ ∪ {B} and {γ k : k < ω} axiomatise the same logic, the two first-order theories ∆ ∪ ST (Σ ∪ {B}) and ∆ ∪ {ST (γ k ) : k < ω} have the same models. Then by the first-order compactness we conclude:
(a) there is l < ω such that ∆ ∪ ST (γ l ) |= ST (B), since l is fixed, we fix n from the condition of lemma, then
, without loss of generality, we may take k > l.
The condition of the lemma gives us an inverse system
By Proposition 18, since all F i |= γ k , F |= γ k . Plainly, F |= ∆. Now, by (c) and (9) we obtain that F |= X. The formulas in X are assumed canonical, and P by construction is countable, therefore by Lemma 19 F + |= X as well. By (10), (F + ) + |= ST (X).
As F + |= γ l , (10) gives (
Now we have (F + ) + |= ∆ ∪ ST (X ∪ {B}), so by (b) and (10) we arrive at F + |= γ n , a contradition to (L3).
Erdös graphs, or putting it all together
This section is dedicated to the proof of the following theorem, the hardest result of our paper. In order to do it, we use the following theorem. Given l, we announce n = (2 bl + 1) · (b − 1) + 1. Then, given k, we apply Theorem 22 with s = 2 bk + 1, and get a sequence of graphs H i and surjective homomorphisms ρ i :
Now, we define the sequence G i to be the disjoint union of H i and K 2 bl +1 (here K m is the full graph on m vertices), and extend ρ i to G i+1 by putting it identical on K 2 bl +1 . Finally, we set
, and define morphisms f i : F i+1 → F i by f i (w 0 ) = w 0 and f i ((w j , v)) = (w j , ρ i (v)) for j ≥ 1. (E1) guarantees that all f i are indeed p-morphisms. It is easy to see that
and
Now we have apply Lemma 14 to ensure that (L1), (L2), (L3) hold for formulas γ D i .
(L1): By (E3), H i has chromatic number 2 bk + 1, and so it cannot be painted in 2 bk colours.
Since H i is a subgraph of G i , G i also cannot be painted in 2 bk colours. Thus, by (C1), F i |= γ Proof. It is enough to establish that E D (x 0 ) is locally modally definable by a generalised
Sahlqvist formula, and then use the generalised Sahlqvist theorem [10] on completeness. A rigourous proof of modal definability of E D (x 0 ) by a generalised Sahlqvist formula can be found in [18] , Theorem 4.3. Since the proof is quite long, we do not reproduce it here. A shorter proof of modal definability of E D (x 0 ) was given earlier in [27] . (I-vi): As it is known (e.g. from [19] ), to prove that a normal modal logic L is not axiomatisable with finitely many variables, it is sufficient to construct a sequence of Kripke frames F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , . . . , such that (a) F i |= L for all i.
(b) for all k there exists n such that (F n , θ) |= L for every k-generated valuation θ on F n . And this can be easily done: take F i = F D ± × K i for all i ∈ ω. Then (a) follows from Lemma 14, (C2) and (b) follows from Lemma 14, (C1), and the fact that K n cannot be painted in less then n colours (take n = 2 bk + 1).
(I-ix): it is clear that F i∈ω K i is isomorph to K α for some infinite α (cf. the proof of Theorem 10 of [14] ). This contradicts Proposition 13.
We would like to discuss the family of Kripke frame classes that are covered by our theorem. They are defined by first-order formulas of the form ∀x 0 ∃x 1 . . . ∃x n x i R λ x j . We have chosen this family because it is large enough to generate modal logics of both types of the dichotomy, and narrow enough to allow the dichotomy to be proven. How interesting is this family? On the one hand, these formulas may seem rather artificial, since very few of them may be said to be orthodox in modal logic, though they include well known reflexivity and reflexive-successor conditions. It also seems difficult to invent a practical reasoning problem involving these formulas. On the other hand, if we omit the universal quantifier, then we obtain existential conjunctive formulas, which recently have received much attention both in the logical and computer science communities under the name of conjunctive queries. If we close the class of existential conjunctive formulas with many free variables under restricted universal quantification, we obtain the class of ∀∃-formulas discussed in Section 6 of [18] , which includes many more first-order conditions traditional to modal logic. Thus our formulas may be understood as 'building blocks' for more complicated and interesting formulas, and so our result can be considered as a step towards more general dichotomy theorems. First-order formulas of the form φ(x) = ∃y(xR λ y ∧ ψ(y)) where ψ(y) is a generalised Kracht formula may be good candidates for further research; see [1] and [9] for known information about the corresponding modal logics. It is also interesting if the condition (I-xi) {F | F |= Log(C)} is ∆-elementary may be added to (I-i) -(I-x) without breaking the dichotomy.
